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ABSTRACT
A Dark Pattern (DP) is an interface maliciously crafted to
deceive users into performing actions they did not mean to
do. In this work, we analyze Dark Patterns in 240 popular
mobile apps and conduct an online experiment with 589 users
on how they perceive Dark Patterns in such apps. The results
of the analysis show that 95% of the analyzed apps contain
one or more forms of Dark Patterns and, on average, popular
applications include at least seven different types of deceiving
interfaces. The online experiment shows that most users do not
recognize Dark Patterns, but can perform better in recognizing
malicious designs if informed on the issue. We discuss the
impact of our work and what measures could be applied to
alleviate the issue.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, the CHI research community has seen
an increasing interest in investigating critical aspects of UX
practice, not only related to the impact of UX on the society
[28, 31, 62, 82], but also from the perspective of designers
and the way they apply responsible changes [56, 58, 92]. One
of the outcomes of such interest is the definition of Dark
Patterns (DPs)—user interfaces that trick the users into doing
something they did not mean to do [33]. For example, DPs
include sneaking unwanted items into the basket, adding users
to costly subscriptions, and misleading with double negatives
(e.g., ⊠ Uncheck here not to download the add-on). Dark
Patterns can also lead users to over-share personal information
[40, 98], thus potentially leading to privacy breaches. Users
might involuntarily accept to share personal data or give more
permission than intended.
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Researchers have been studying Dark Patterns under differ-
ent lenses. For instance, Moser et al. [65], analyzed 200 top
e-commerce websites and found multiple UI elements that
trigger buying in most websites. Similarly, Mathur et al. [63]
found that 11% of 11k e-commerce top web applications use
some forms of DPs in their designs. Moreover, substantial
effort has been spent on the elicitation of taxonomies to cat-
egorize different types of Dark Patterns [35, 45]. One of the
most recent studies has been presented by Gray et al. [45],
who proposed five different types of Dark Patterns covering
various aspects like redirection from a task to another or UI
malicious interferences.
In this work, we continue the academic discourse on Dark Pat-
terns by exploring two new angles: (1) how prominent Dark
Patterns are in popular mobile apps and (2) whether users are
aware or can recognize the presence of DPs. In fact, while
previous studies aimed at presenting the existence of Dark
Patterns or at classifying their different categories, there is
still a noticeable lack of knowledge on how prominently they
appear in popular mobile apps and on the perception of users.
The case of mobile apps is critical because of their extreme
pervasiveness and role in social life [68].
Defining an interface as a Dark Pattern can be open to inter-
pretations [45, 60]; for example, asking a mobile app user to
invite their friends in order to receive some in-app bonuses
may seem inappropriate to some users but a legitimate busi-
ness decision to others. In this work, we consider patterns
to be dark when their UI and interaction seem to benefit the
system instead of the user [45].
In particular, we analyzed 240 apps (30 for each of the 8 main
categories of applications on the Google Play Store [12]) to
identify the instances of Dark Patterns they contain, classifying
them into the taxonomy proposed by Gray et al. [45]. Unlike
all previous works in the field [45, 63, 65]—which classified
dark patterns by analyzing screenshots of segments of pages—
we applied an active process in which two researchers jointly
used each app, performing a series of common tasks to reach
certain goals (e.g., creating an account, visiting the setting
page), similarly to cognitive walk-through techniques [70].
From this study, we found that mobile apps have, on average,
more than seven instances of Dark Patterns.
Subsequently, we conducted an online experiment using five
of the Dark Patterns found during the classification phase and
studied whether users could perceive them (DP-blindness).
We found that users often cannot identify the presence of some
malicious UI interactions, underlining the need for proper
mechanisms to make users aware of malicious UIs and their
potential threats.
With this work, we make the following contributions: (i) an
analysis of Dark Patterns prevalence in popular mobile apps;
(ii) a publicly available dataset [6] containing the recording
of each app and its Dark Patterns classification; and (iii) the
results and discussion of an online evaluation on the perception
of users on Dark Patterns.
BACKGROUND
Many web/mobile applications could give the impression of
tricking users: for example, by hiding relevant data or options.
This situation led researchers to debate how ethical modern
UX design is and investigate what Dark Patterns are used in
the current digital world.
Ethical UX Design
Improving user interfaces and their usability is one of the
main focuses of human-computer interaction. Frameworks,
guidelines, and various techniques have been proposed to
improve the user experience of applications [54, 71, 72, 81].
The ten heuristics by Nielsen, established in 1994, have been
the foundation for further improvements of user interfaces [69].
With the advent of mobile devices, additional guidelines and
rules have been proposed [49, 67, 78, 99].
Nevertheless, a usable application does not imply an ethical
one. Although there is no widely established definition of
‘Ethical UI’, experts in the field have provided their take on it.
For example, Karr stated on ethical design [52]:
“... I like to think of ethical things as thoughts, words,
behaviors, designs, systems, and customs that are cumu-
latively more beneficial to life than they are harmful.”
Also, Latham, from the UX Collective [59], connects ethical
design to personal freedom and discusses that subtle manipu-
lations in advertisements and digital media may condition our
choices.
Gray et al., [45] emphasize the important ethical aspects of
Dark Patterns. While design is—by definition—a persuasive
act and has the potential to manipulate the user [73, 74, 83],
there are occasions where designers may abuse this power. In
this respect, the HCI community is working toward a design
that is more ethical [42, 47, 79, 84, 85] also for future UIs,
such as home robots and proxemic interactions [46, 57].
In the context of ethical design, researchers often have criti-
cized neuromarketing strategies [66, 86, 93, 97]. Neuromar-
keting is a new field that uses techniques such as fMRI [50],
EEG [53], and gaze detection [55] to investigate the effects
of marketing inputs [29, 53, 94, 96]. Among various dis-
coveries, neuromarketing research found that the feeling of
“loosing out” is particularly effective in influencing users [38,
39, 90]. Based on this finding, e-commerce websites use
countdowns and limited offers to pressure customers [34, 48,
65]. Although neuromarketing “choices” may improve user
engagement, as well as fasten certain interactions on the web-
site [43, 61, 91], they may become unethical when employed
to coerce users [65].
Researchers have classified the artificially created sense of
urgency and scarcity (included in the design of many e-
commerce websites) as a Dark Pattern [33, 35, 45]. However,
Dark Patterns go beyond shopping activities. Games, social
media, news applications, and more can all include malicious
designs [30, 32, 33, 41, 98]. Since most teens today use mo-
bile devices extensively (95% of adolescents have access to a
smartphone and spend significant portions of their days con-
suming media on mobile phones [27]) and minors are more
easily manipulable [36, 75, 95], the presence of Dark Patterns
in mobile applications becomes urgently relevant. Despite this
factor, there is still a lack of knowledge on the prominence
and types of potentially malicious designs in everyday mobile
apps—a gap that we address with the first part of this work.
Luguri and Strahilevitz [60] discuss Dark Patterns from a
legal perspective and employed an online survey to study
the impact of more aggressive Dark Patterns on users. In
particular, Luguri and Strahilevitz faked a subscription system,
where users were asked to accept or decline the offer of a six
months (not free) data protection plan. In the mild version of
the Dark Pattern, users could either ‘Accept (recommended)’
the program or click on ‘Other options’, where they could
eventually refuse the plan. In the aggressive version of the
pattern, upon decline, users were asked to read additional
information about identify theft and then wait ten seconds.
The authors found that 26% (mild option) and 42% (aggressive
option) of the treated participants accepted the plan, in contrast
to only 11% among the participants without Dark Patterns.
With the second part of this work, we extend the findings
discussed by Luguri and Strahilevitz, by studying blindness
to Dark Patterns (DP-blindness). We hypothesize that Dark
Patterns may also work because users are not always aware of
the presence of Dark Patterns, especially in mild cases. DP-
blindness may be the new Ads on display-blindness [76, 37,
77, 51].
Taxonomies of Dark Patterns
The darkpatterns.org portal (established in 2010 by
Brignull [33]) collects various examples of Dark Patterns on
web and mobile applications, gathered through the reports
of users via Twitter. Brignull’s goal is to raise awareness on
the topic while also proposing a classification of Dark Pat-
terns into different categories. The examples tweeted with the
hashtag #darkpatterns populate the ‘Hall of Shame’ of the
portal.
Conti and Sobiesk [35] proposed a taxonomy with eleven
classes of Dark Patterns with twenty subclasses. Among the
various categories, authors included Distraction (e.g., col-
ors or blinking animations used to attract users) and Forced
Work (e.g., force users to watch an Ad) as types of Dark Pat-
terns. Gray et al., proposed the most recent taxonomy of Dark
Patterns [45], re-defining Brignull’s taxonomy by starting from
a set of artifacts gathered from blogs, websites, and social me-
dia. The categorization of Dark Patterns, as delineated by
Brignull, was made sharper and more general.
Gray et al., [45] proposed five different types of Dark Patterns:
Nagging is a redirection from the current task that can hap-
pen one or more times.
Obstruction patterns block the task flow, making it harder
to perform. The Obstruction class includes three sub-
classes: Intermediate Currency (multiple currencies,
such as game gems), Price Comparison Prevention
(uncopiable product names), and Roach Motel (easy to
open an account, yet hard to delete it).
Sneaking patterns try to disguise relevant information to
the user. This category comprises four subclasses: Bait
and Switch (a certain action seems to have a specific re-
sult; instead it causes another, unwanted outcome), Hidden
Costs (an item initially costs X , but in the basket its
value increases), Sneak into Basket (unwanted items
are added in the basket), and Forced Continuity (e.g.,
subscription is automatically continued after its free trial
expires).
Interface Interferences are UI manipulation that are
biased towards certain UIs elements. This includes:
Hidden Information (options to accept conditions are
small/greyed-out), Preselection (unfavorable options are
preselected), and Aesthetic Manipulation (distracting
manipulation of the UI). This last subclass has four sub-
subclasses: Toying with emotions (countdown to of-
fers), False Hierarchy (one option is more prevalent),
Disguised Ad (interactive games), and Trick Questions
(double negatives).
Forced Action coerces users into performing certain tasks
to obtain something. Three sub-classes belong to this
type: Social Pyramid (adding friends to obtain benefits),
Privacy Zuchering (sharing more personal data than in-
tended), and Gamification (forced grinding tasks to ob-
tain something otherwise available with money).
In this work, we use the aforementioned taxonomy by Gray et
al., [45], because it is the most updated. Although this taxon-
omy proved to perform well for our task, we had to extend the
original meaning of Aesthetic Manipulation and Forced
Action classes to include a few new DPs instances (we detail
how we extended the taxonomy in the following section).
THE PERVASIVENESS OF DARK PATTERNS IN TOP
FREE-TO-USE MOBILE APPS
We classify malicious designs on 240 trending applications
available on Google Play Store [12]. In the next sections, we
detail how we executed the study and the obtained results.
Corpus Generation
We focus on applications with the following features: (1) avail-
able on the Android platform, (2) free of charge to download,
and (3) trending in the US market.
We choose Android because it is the most popular platform
among smartphone and tablet users [87]. Similarly, we only
focus on free-to-use apps, because of their higher popular-
ity [89].1 Finally, we study top trending applications to best
sample apps that users may employ in their everyday life.
While it is not possible to obtain the names of most down-
loaded apps from the Google Play store, we can gather the list
of the most trending ones. The Google algorithm that calcu-
lates apps ranking is not public, and it has changed over the
years. From Google official announcements, we see that app
downloads and user engagement are some of the parameters
used in this ranking [80]. Such ranking of apps is suited for
the scope of our study because it also considers new apps
that have gained high popularity in the latest period. For in-
stance, in the months we performed the classification, the
FaceApp [8] application gained much traction in a short time.
Probably, considering an overall download ranking, this ap-
plication would have had a hard time reaching the number of
downloads of more senior apps; therefore, it would not have
been added to our list.
The Google Play Store organizes apps in eight main cate-
gories: Photography, Family, Shopping, Social, Music and
Audio, Entertainment, Personalization, and Communication.
We exclude the Personalization category because apps in this
category are all composed of Android launchers (e.g., set of
icons, widgets, wallpapers), which are extremely different
from the rest of the studied applications. Although news apps
are popular among users [88], we note that they were scarce in
the remaining seven categories. Therefore, we include a News
and Magazines category on the list.
For each category, we select the 30 most trending mobile apps.
This selection was performed by using a crawler that collected
data from the SensorTower [20] website, which allows users to
see the list of most trending apps. The crawling was executed
among the 12th and 13th of July 2019. The country of selec-
tion was set as the US (Europe and global selections were not
possible), which had the broadest and biggest range of users
of Western countries that could be selected on SensorTower.
The crawler logged 400 most trending free apps of each cate-
gory and saved additional information about each application
(e.g., number of installs, user ranking, and number of reviews).
From this list, we selected the top 30. However, certain apps
had to be skipped for one of the following reasons: (i) the
application was not available anymore, (ii) the application was
not available in the country of the authors, (iii) the app already
appeared in a previous category, (iv) the app is a launcher. If
an app needed to be skipped, we included the next one in the
ranking.
Our final list was therefore composed of 30 most trending
apps for eight different categories, for a total of 240 Google
Play applications. The list also includes applications such
as Facebook [9], Amazon [1], Twitter [25], Netflix [15], and
Spotify [22].
1In the case of Netflix, which was the only free app with a paywall,
we subscribed to their free-month service to use the application.
Methodology
In the studies by Moser et al., [65] and Mathur et al., [63],
researchers have collected screenshots of segments of pages
to recognize malicious designs in e-shopping websites. In
some instances, though, one can infer the presence of Dark
Patterns only interacting with the artifact. For instance, Bait
and Switch is a design that changes the meaning of certain
actions to trick the user. Clicking on a download button should
mean that the user wants to download a selected item, not
showing an Ad asking to upgrade to premium. The Ad per se
may not contain Dark Patterns, but the interaction needed to
reach that interface is malicious. For this reason, we analyze
each app while in use, instead of relying on static images.
Particularly, we first record example usage of each app, then
we classify the resulting videos.
Recording Methodology
The recording process was split among the first two authors
of this paper, who used half of the apps each. To record each
app, both authors used a One Plus 5, with the latest Android
version [16]. Two new Gmail [11] accounts were created to
perform the study. Furthermore, two new sim cards were also
bought to protect the privacy of the researchers while using
the apps.
The use of each app was recorded with an external Android
application [3] that captures the mobile’s display. The re-
searchers started the recording right before launching the app.
Every application was used for ten minutes, for a total of
2,400 minutes (40 hours) of recorded usage. During the ten
minutes, the researchers performed the following tasks (when
available), similarly to an inspection walk-through [70]: (i)
creating an account and log out; (ii) closing and reopening
the app; (iii) visiting the market page; (iv) going to the setting
page; (v) continuing shopping until checkout; (vi) trying to
select product names in e-shopping; (vii) using the app for its
intended use (e.g., playing games, browse news article).
This walk-through protocol ensures consistency in our method
but has the drawback that it does not cover the cases of apps
with hidden features or mechanisms that are only unlocked
after an app has been used for a while. Moreover, each app is
in the new state: It has never been opened before the beginning
of our recording.
We did not purchase any products or services in apps. In
e-shopping applications, we stopped right before buying the
item(s). Although specific Dark Patterns may appear only after
performing a purchase, we could not afford to buy products
for each considered app. We did, however, subscribe to free
services if the app was not usable without registering (as in
the case of Netflix).
Classification Method
After the recording, we randomly selected 40 of the 240 apps
(five for each of the eight categories) and classified any in-
stances of Dark Patterns following the taxonomy of Gray et
al., [45]. The classification was performed in pair by the first
two authors of the paper. In this phase, both researchers ana-
lyzed the videos together to mitigate the risk of DP-blindness.
Disagreements on a specific Dark Pattern were noted for later
analysis; these cases were then discussed with a third re-
searcher, also knowledgeable about Dark Patterns: The final
decision on the Dark Pattern classification was taken by major-
ity voting. This initial set allowed us to understand the power
of the considered taxonomy, as well as to decide additional
rules for the classification of future Dark Patterns.
In contrast to previous work [65, 63], the two researchers
continued the classification together for the remaining 200
apps. In fact, we found that DP-blindness, especially in video
recordings, also affected experts in the field. After the entire
classification process (which lasted 120 hours), the two authors
double-checked the classification sheet to find mistakes.
We did not count re-occurrences of Dark Patterns, meaning
that each Dark Pattern was reported only the first time it ap-
peared. We consider Dark Pattern as a re-occurrence of a
previous one if the same UI would appear by performing a
similar interaction (e.g., clicking on a button, opening the set-
ting page). We made this decision to reduce the effect of how
the app was used during the recording. Instead, we kept track
of Dark Patterns if the same interaction would give a different
malicious UI design as a result.
Taxonomy Adaptation and Interpretation of Dark Patterns
Although we found the taxonomy by Gray et al., [45] to be
descriptive enough after the testing phase, we had to extend
and adapt it to our scenario.
First, we could not include the classes Forced Continuity
and Gamification. For the former class, apps continue users’
subscription also after the end of the plan, therefore this class
requires one to subscribe to certain programs, which we did
not do during the recording phase. The Gamification Dark
Pattern forces the user to repeat certain actions (often dull)
to continue in the game. Unfortunately, this instance of Dark
Pattern is hard to perceive in the first ten minutes usage of an
application. Especially at the beginning of a game, it seems
that app authors try to increase user engagement and propose
more interesting features.
We found instances of Dark Patterns that were not explicitly
included in the considered taxonomy. For instance, watching
an Ad to unlock certain features was not described. However,
we found that this Dark Pattern may easily fit in the Forced
Action category (e.g., force users to perform actions to obtain
something in return) [45, 35].2
Understanding designers’ intentions and ethical decisions is
subjective and may lead to imprecision; thus, we limited our
research exclusively to the final UI product. Therefore, on
every occasion in which an interface seemed to benefit the
app rather than the user, we classified the design as a Dark
Pattern. For instance, if an app asks for location permissions
and the UI seems to prefer the ‘accept’ option, we consider it
as a malicious design (False Hierarchy in this case), even
though the designers may have intended this feature to speed
up the interaction process.
Furthermore, to improve consistency and reduce subjectivity in
the classification, we limited the number of cases we consider
2Our dataset discusses few additional adaptations and choices [6].
Table 1. Dark Patterns and their associated subclasses, according to the
considered taxonomy. The global label indicates whether the DP can
only appear in an app a single time (S) or multiple times (M).
DP Case Classes S/M
Ad with interactive game Disguised Ad M
Moving Ads button AestheticManipulation M
Small close button on Ad AestheticManipulation M
A pop-up appears and interrupts the user in their task Nagging M
Invite friends to get something in return Social Pyramid S
Ad appears as normal content Disguised Ad M
A sponsored content not clearly different from rest
of the content Disguised Ad M
Icons\buttons are Ads, but it is not clear Disguised Ad M
Countdown on Ads Forced Action M
Daily\weekly rewards or features Forced Action S
Login to obtain some rewards\bonus Forced Action S
Countdown on rewards Forced Action S
Watching Ad to unlock feature Forced Action S
There are two or more options, but the one that is
more beneficial for them is more prominent
False
Hierarchy M




Multiple currencies Inter. Currency S
Shame user for not doing something
Toying With
Emotions M
Pop-up to rate Nagging M





The notifications (and\or emails and sms) are
preselected Preselection S
The option is preselected Preselection M
App already follows pages by default Preselection M





Private settings related dps
Privacy
Zuckering M
Not possible to delete account Roach Motel S
Not possible to logout Roach Motel S
Sneak into basket unwanted items Sneaking S
Double negatives in selections Trick Question MM
It looks like you have to login, but you can actually
use the feature (app) for free
Aesthetic
Manipulation M
User clicks a feature (which does not look like a
premium) and get a PRO ad or open google play
Bait & Switch,
Disguised Ad M
as Dark Patterns. For instance, for the Bait and Switch
class, we only included the case in which the user clicks on
a feature that looks available to be used for free and find
out that it is, instead, only accessible for premium users or
by downloading another app. During the classification of
the first 40 apps, we found the Bait and Switch category
to be too generic, thus too subjective; the aforementioned
more conservative approach mitigated this issue. Overall, we
considered 33 Dark Pattern cases, for the 16 subcategories [45]
(see Table 1). Given the nature of some of the studied Dark
Patterns (e.g., ‘It was not possible to delete account’), twelve
cases could be counted only once per app (S in Table 1). Each
Dark Pattern case may include more than one Dark Pattern
class. Furthermore, Dark Patterns are not mutually exclusive,
as one case may appear in conjunction with one or more other
Dark Pattern cases. In the results, we refer to Dark Patterns as
the number of occurrences of all subcategories.
Results
Among the 240 studied apps, 95% included one or more Dark
Patterns in their interfaces. Overall, 1,787 Dark Patterns were
found among all apps, with an average of 7.4 malicious designs
per application (std. dev.: 5). Almost 10% of the apps included
0, 1, or 2 Dark Patterns (N=33), 37% of the apps contained
between 3 to 6 Dark Patterns (N=89), while the remaining
49% included 7 or more (N=118).
DP Classes in Mobile Apps
Among the five DP macro-categories, apps contains an average
of 2.7 classes each (std. dev.: 1.1), with 37% of the apps
including 3 (N=89), 25% with 4 or 5 (N=62), 23% having 2
(N=55), and 14% including 1 or none (N=34).
Considering the 16 subcategories (Table 1), apps contained
4.3 classes on average (std.: 2.6). Most apps (63% N=152)
contain at least four different subcategories. The most frequent
DP subcategory was Nagging (N=352), followed by False
Hierarchy (N=299) and Preselection (N=210).
In Figure 1, we show the percentage of apps with at least one
occurrence of each subcategory. Most apps (55%) interrupted
the users in some way, to ask permissions, rate their product,
or to show Ads. Often these pop-ups gave one or more options
to the user, and many times the alternative that benefited the
app was aesthetically favored. This contributed to the False
Hierarchy class being present in 61% of the apps.
A total of 60% of the apps also include Preselection Dark
Patterns. The most frequent DP among this subclass is notifi-
cation preselection (push, email, and SMS) (N=121). Among
these applications, 81 contain more than two notifications
already preselected.
The app with most Dark Patterns in our corpus was ‘Call Free -
Free call’ [5], with a total of 23 Dark Patterns, belonging to 10
different subcategories. Wish [26] followed, with 20 different
malicious designs in 8 subcategories. Twelve apps contained
no Dark Patterns (5% out of 240 applications); among these:
Snapseed [21], Lego Juniors [14], and Barcode Scanner [4].
DPs and App Categories
By measuring the correlations between the number of Dark
Patterns and app categories (we ran Welch ANOVA since our
data failed parametric assumptions), we found that the News
and Magazine category had fewer Dark Patterns when com-
pared to other types: Music and Audio, Entertainment, Shop-
ping, Social, and Communication (F[7,232]= 3.390, p<0.05).
Besides this, we did not find any other significant correlation.
Discussion
Through our manual classification, we found that the vast
majority of trending applications use some form of malicious































Figure 1. Percentage of apps containing each subcategory.
Although the majority of the found Dark Patterns “simply”
manipulates user interfaces, there are cases where more sen-
sitive actions are involved. For instance, 31% of the apps
contain Privacy Zuckering, whose most common cause is
privacy conditions accepted upon clicking some buttons or
continuing with the registration process. We considered only
cases where these labels were particularly small and hard to
find. Often, this information was greyed or hidden by some
other UI elements. On some other occasions, the app would
activate by default the ‘send usage data’ in the setting page.
Also, particularly popular applications, such as Firefox [10]
and Reddit [17], included this DP instance.
About Roach Motel Dark Patterns, we only considered the
following two cases: ‘It is not possible to logout’ and ‘It is not
possible to delete the account’. This subcategory appeared in
41% of the apps; however, the majority of apps did not require
an account to be used. Among the apps that allowed us to login,
the vast majority did not include a ‘delete account’ feature
within the app. Although we connected through our Gmail
account whenever available, we believe that app developers
should include at least a link to the Gmail account management
page from their apps, since some users may be unaware of its
existence or find it hard to reach it. Among the apps that do
not include this feature, we found Spotify, Wish, Instagram
[13], and Amazon Photos [2].
During the classification, we did not question the designer’s in-
tentions; instead, we focused on the final UI. Some UX choices
could be the result of mistakes, pressure from management,
or mimicking popular designs [44]. For instance, the case of
the inability to disconnect Gmail accounts was long discussed
among authors: Although we recognize that designers might
have copied from other apps, we also found that the inability
to delete an account favors the app rather than the user, and we
label it as a Dark Pattern. Copying from others may explain
part of the pervasiveness of DPs in mobile UIs.
Finally, some subcategories did not appear often. For instance,
the Price Comparison Prevention was found 23 times in
240 apps. However, this DP is detectable in Shopping apps
only (N=30), in which it appeared in 77% of the cases.
ONLINE EXPERIMENT
Luguri and Strahilevitz [60] found that mild and aggressive
Dark Patterns can have a significant impact on user behavior.
While users perceived aggressive Dark Patterns as particularly
annoying, mild Dark Patterns had lower impacts on users’
experience. We hypothesize that users may have developed
a sort of DP-blindness to malicious design. To study this in
detail, we carry out an online experiment in the form of an
online survey that included videos of the apps’ usage.
The questionnaire received 589 answers from users with over
40 distinct nationalities and different background experiences.
In the following, we report on the design of the study, its par-
ticipants, and the final results, as well as discuss our analysis.
Design and Structure
The experiment, in the form of an online survey, started with a
small introduction, where we stated that participants would be
asked to watch videos to evaluate the overall user experience of
apps. For each user that participated in the study, we donated
two dollars to a charity of user’s choice (e.g., Wikimedia



















Figure 2. Structure of the online survey.
After this introduction, we followed the structure as repre-
sented in Figure 2. Each user evaluated three apps in this order:
two containing malicious designs (randomly selected from:
Tag with Ryan [23], Roblox [18], Romwe [19], Talkatone [24],
Face Reading [7]) and one that did not (Lego Juniors).
For each app, users were first asked if they have ever used the
app, only heard about it, or never come across it. If users used
the app, we asked how often they used it in the last year, how
they would rate it (one to five stars), and to briefly explain the
reasons behind the rate (Steps A and D in Figure 2).
Once users completed this part, on the next page, they could
watch a 30-second video and answer usability questions on
the app (ease of understanding, ease of use) with a 5-point
Likert scale (from ‘Totally disagree’ to ‘Totally agree’). We
also asked to rate the app again and briefly motivate the rating
(step B and E in Figure 2).
Subsequently (Steps C and F of Figure 2), in a new page of
the survey (with no possibility of going back), participants
were asked if they could spot any malicious designs in the
previous video. In the question, we defined a malicious design
as: “e.g., user interfaces crafted to trick the users in doing
things they do not want to do or try to manipulate the user in
some way.” To this questions, users could answer ‘yes,’ ‘no,’
or ‘not sure.’ If the answer was ‘yes’ or ‘not sure,’ we also
asked to briefly explain the malicious design. Overall, we did
not prime users on Dark Patterns and its definition; instead,
we always used the more generic ‘malicious design’ term. We
made this decision to mitigate possible biases and to capture
DP-blindness. Moreover, we asked this question after each
video, and not after all apps, so that people would more easily
remember its content and interactions.
Finally (step G in Figure 2), we showed users screenshots of
the malicious designs for each app they evaluated. If they
previously reported having identified some maliciousness, we
asked if it was the same as just described. If instead, they did
not spot it, we asked why (‘I did not see it,’ ‘I did not found
it to be malicious,’ ‘Other reasons’). Moreover, participants
were asked to evaluate how annoying each malicious design
was (from ‘Very annoying’ to ‘Not annoying at all’). We
concluded the experiment by asking background information.
We used a fixed DP-DP-NoDP order in our study for the
following reasons:
1. We start with Dark Pattern as a way to measure (without
losing any participant) to what extent users recognize the
presence of Dark Patterns when they are not informed (or
primed) about this concept, yet. Only after seeing the first
app, participants read the first questions that ask about DPs.
2. We continue with Dark Pattern to measure the impact of a
priming Dark Pattern task on a target Dark Pattern task [64],
an experimental priming design of two consecutive target
trials is the standard and shows reliable priming effects on
the second trial (as opposed to an interrupted series).
3. Having NoDP last allowed us to measure how much users
would recognize the absence of Dark Patterns (after they
learn about them) while fulfilling the previous two points.
Selected Dark Patterns and Mobile Apps
To study if users may spot Dark Patterns in user interfaces, we
used five apps (from our dataset) with Dark Patterns and one
without any Dark Patterns. Each user evaluated three apps, two
containing a Dark Pattern and one free from malicious designs.
The first two apps would rotate among the aforementioned
five. Instead, the last one (without Dark Patterns) was always
the same.
With this design, we aimed to not only capture DP-blindness
but also study potential learning effects. We hypothesized that
after the first app evaluation, users would be more attentive to
possible Dark Patterns.
We portrayed five instances of Dark Patterns for five dif-
ferent macro-classes [45] to study blindness depending on
the Dark Pattern category. We picked five subclasses:
Nagging, Intermediate Currency, False Hierarchy,
Forced Action, and Sneak into Basket (see Figure 3).
We chose only a subset of the classes to limit the length of
the survey. In addition, other classes of Dark Patterns were
not suited for our study. For instance, it is hard to portray
the impossibility of selecting product names in the Price
Comparison Prevention class in a video. An additional
challenge we faced was that most malicious designs do not
comprise one class only. For instance, in our dataset, we could
not find a Sneak into Basket without a Preselection
UI (e.g., insurances preselected by default while buying prod-
ucts). However, we could not find another suitable occurrence
of the Sneaking class. For this reason, we kept the Sneak
into Basket Dark Pattern even if in conjunction with the
Preselection one (see Figure 3, Romwe app). We keep a
note of this factor in the analysis and discussion of the results.
In summary, we started by selecting the Dark Pattern cases
from each top category of Dark Pattern. Some types of Dark
Pattern did not fit the experiment, and others were never
A) Face Reading B) Romwe
C) Tag with Ryan
E) RobloxD) Talkatone
Figure 3. Screenshot of Dark Patterns of the five apps used in the survey. A) The Face Reading app contains a popup rating that interrupts the user
(Nagging). B) The Romwe e-shopping app, adds an insurance by default when checking out (Sneak into Basket, and Preselection). C) The Tag
with Ryan app, asks the user to watch an Ad to continue playing (Forced Action); D) The Talkatone app highlights the "Get my location" option
either than the skip one (False Hierarchy). E) The Roblox app has many currencies (Intermediate Currency).
present in isolation for 30 seconds. These two characteris-
tics dictated stringently which apps we could use, and we
picked them accordingly.
Participants
We recruited users through social media, universities’ mailing
lists, and by snowballing out of our networks. The survey had
589 completed responses. Overall, 58% of the participants
are women, 39% are men, 2.5% preferred not to disclose, and
0.5% chose to self-describe. The reported age ranged from 19
to 77 years old (avg.: 30.3, std.: 10.75). We had participants
of 46 different Nationalities (e.g., United States, UK, German,
Brazilian, Italian, Swiss).
Most respondents reported to have attended secondary school
(45%); in addition, several participants have a bachelor (31%),
master (42%) or doctoral degree (23%). Among the college
degrees, 28% were in Computer Science, Web Design, or
Information Technology.
The vast majority of our participants use their smartphones
every day (98%), while they use tablets less frequently (47%).
Finally, most participants have no previous familiarity with
any of the apps used in the experiment (88%).
Results
DP-Blindness
As we randomly assign two apps to each participant, a different
amount of participants answered questions about different
apps. For instance, 239 participants answered questions about
Face Reading, while 248 answered questions about Romwe.
As the third app, we assigned Lego (control) to all participants.
Table 2 presents the total amount of participants per app, as
well as how many users spotted a malicious design.
Regarding whether the participants could identify malicious
designs, we gave the participants the following options: ‘yes’,
‘not sure’, ‘no’. We computed 1,767 answers (1,178 without
the control) to this question as each participant answered this
question to three videos. Overall, the majority of our users did
not spot malicious designs in the app containing Dark Patterns
(55%), some were unsure (20%), and the remaining found a
malicious design in the app (25%). In the control task, 86% of
users were able to recognize that the app had no Dark Patterns.
After showing the video, we asked participants to rate the apps
and comment on the rating. In a new page of the survey, we
asked participants if they identified any malicious designs in
the videos they just watched. Therefore, on the rating page,
participants were not yet primed about malicious designs. We
analyzed their comments to check whether they could identify
or suspect of a Dark Pattern. Overall, out of 366 participants
that answered the open question, only 7% somehow mentioned
a Dark Pattern in their answers.
At the end of the study, we showed the Dark Patterns of the
apps to participants that answered ‘yes’ or ‘not sure’ to the pre-
vious question. We asked these participants whether what they
identified as the malicious design was the same as the Dark
Pattern shown. We did not ask this question to participants
that identified malicious designs on Lego as it has no Dark
Pattern. Among the ones that have spotted a Dark Pattern, only
24% of participants considered their answer correct, while the
remaining 56% were unsure or considered their found mali-
cious design different from the one we showed. Although
most participants did not correctly identify the expected Dark
Patterns, their approach towards the task showed implicitly
distrusts in the application. For this reason, in the following
analysis, we do not exclude participants that did perceive a
malicious design but not the expected Dark Pattern.
DP-Blindness on Apps and Order
We performed a Chi-square test to verify the impact that dif-
ferent apps have on the number of detected and undetected
Dark Patterns. We found that exists a correlation between apps
and the number of Dark Patterns reported by the participants
(χ(10) = 221.167 and p < 0.001).
Table 2. Participants that answered questions regarding each app. Par-
tic. = Amount of participants; Malicious Design = Whether they iden-
tified a malicious design on the first app; Same as DP = Whether the
malicious designs identified by the participants (“yes” or “not sure”) are
the same DPs we identified.









Face Reading 239 129 39 71 34 18 58
ROMWE 248 159 55 34 47 22 20
Roblox 227 103 66 58 36 41 47
Talkatone 246 135 44 67 34 24 53
Tag with Ryan 218 125 34 59 18 24 51
Lego 589 510 50 29 - - -
Total 1,767 1,161 288 318 169 129 229
Among all apps, The Romwe application was the one that per-
formed the worst (we ran pair-wise Chi-square and found sig-
nificance against all other DP-apps, p< 0.05). The e-shopping
app has the lowest percentage of Dark Patterns found (14%)
when compared to all other applications containing Dark Pat-
terns. In contrast, the remaining DP-apps performed similarly
among each other. As expected, the Lego task was the one in
which respondents performed the best against all other appli-
cations (p < 0.05).
While analyzing the first app, the participant was not told to
pay attention to the presence of a malicious design. However,
while looking at the second app, they were more conscious of
this objective. For this reason, we investigated how the order
in which the apps were shown influences the finding of Dark
Patterns. We performed a Chi-square test that confirmed that
users are more attentive in searching Dark Patterns after the
first app (χ(4) = 58.201 and p < 0.001).
DP-Blindness and Demographic
The ability to find a malicious design may be influenced by pre-
vious knowledge they have about Dark Patterns. We checked
this hypothesis performing a Chi-square test on the correla-
tion between the participants’ experience and their answers
when asked if they noticed a Dark Pattern in the app. The
test confirmed that the association is statistically significant
(χ(6) = 81.699 and p < 0.001). We did not obtain any statis-
tical differences in correlations among users age, employment
status, or level of education.
Discussion
The majority of our users were either not able to detect Dark
Patterns or were not sure about it. Some participants explained
that Dark Patterns are so widely spread and common among
modern applications that they become part of the normal in-
teraction flow when using apps. On this matter, when asked
to give general feedback about our experiment, one of our
participants stated:
“As a remark on the watching an ad malicious design [i.e.,
Forced Action Dark Pattern in Tag with Ryan]: that may be
so common already that we just do not consider it any more,
and it allows us and really highlights the option to choose.
Thus, I think it is good to highlight this issue, our attention for
such designs are somewhat fading due to the exposure.”
Similarly, another participant explained that Dark Patterns are
so ubiquitous that they did not mark them because they as-
sumed that the user might already know about the mechanism.
Pervasiveness may be one of the reasons why Dark Patterns
are hard to spot. However, users perform better when more
knowledgeable on the topic or primed on the issue, thus in-
dicating that knowing about Dark Pattern does help to detect
them, despite their prevalence.
Some users also commented about the importance of such
experiments, since they can make the population aware of the
issue, as well as alert parents on the use their kids have on
mobile applications. About this, one of our participants wrote:
“... That kids are being targeted to advertising every X minutes
or even seconds cannot be good for their brains and behaviour!
This is a topic that must be investigated”
As previously mentioned, children are less aware of the dif-
ference between Ads and real content and are more easily
manipulable than adults [36, 75, 95]. In this context, Dark
Patterns can be a significant issue. For instance, the Nagging
malicious design, the most common Dark Pattern in our clas-
sification, often interrupts users to display Ads or features
accessible only through payments. Given these factors, it is
particularly relevant to continue the discussion on malicious
designs and inform the users of the possibility of DP-blindness.
IMPLICATIONS
The results of our studies reveal several aspects with impli-
cations for researchers, mobile app users, and designers. We
provide an overview of the outcomes as well as the impact of
our findings for different stakeholders.
More empirical research is needed. One of the most sur-
prising results of our study relates to the high pervasiveness
of Dark Patterns in mobile apps; 95% of the considered apps
include one or more forms of Dark Patterns. This opens ques-
tions concerning the causes behind their introduction as well
as the motivations leading designers to introduce malicious
designs. We argue that more research on the harmfulness
of each specific Dark Pattern category should be conducted
to inform users about potential privacy and security threats.
Furthermore, it is still unknown whether there exist specific
instances of a certain malicious design category that are more
problematic than others: in this sense, a characterization of
Dark Patterns could be a useful means to address the lack of
knowledge on their relevance and impact. While previous
work [40, 98] has started investigating this direction, we argue
that this is still an open research debate.
On the perspective of experts. With the contributions of this
paper, designers can take advantage of the concrete set of Dark
Patterns and their prevalence as a basis to increase awareness
around the problem, as well as extend their knowledge on
principles of ethical design. Also, our taxonomy can warn
practitioners about the risk of mimicking mechanisms from
other, even popular UIs. Furthermore, researchers can use our
benchmark to refine the taxonomy of Dark Patterns further
and extend it by classifying and discussing cases not included
in our study.
Finally, future research could recognize commonalities among
Dark Patterns and, therefore, help the automatic recognition
of malicious designs also thanks to our classification dataset.
On the perspective of users. While our work tries to bring
contributions that mainly target the academic community, we
hope that it also provides information to users. Indeed, ac-
cording to our findings, users are generally not aware of and
cannot correctly recognize malicious designs. On the one
hand, this reinforces the idea that more automated solutions
would be required. On the other hand, our findings highlight
that users should be more careful when using mobile apps.
The community can use our data to build educational tools
for mobile users who can learn the concept of Dark Patterns,
reduce user’s blindness, and experiment with these tools to
understand the risks of Dark Patterns. For instance, a publicly
available platform can be created to inform parents/educators
on the risks of Dark Patterns for children as well as guiding
them in the interaction with certain apps.
LIMITATIONS
Although we followed previous research in the field of Dark
Patterns [45] and the considered taxonomy was particularly
powerful for our tasks, certain adaptations were necessary.
Some malicious designs were not stated by authors, thus we
needed to interpret definitions of classes to associate Dark
Patterns. Similarly, some borderline cases may be seen as
malicious designs or not depending on the viewer. In our
classification, we tackle this problem by first conducting the
task in pairs and, secondly, discussing our opinions with a
third researcher during testing.
To further maintain coherency among different apps, we re-
strict the number of cases to be considered as malicious de-
signs. For instance, we did not include all the features dis-
cussed by Moser et al. [65] in e-shopping applications. Despite
the necessity to restrict the scope of the study, the quantity of
found Dark Patterns remains particularly high.
We studied free apps of the Android platform and classified
instances of Dark Patterns that appear in the first ten minutes
usage of the application. Different Dark Patterns may be
found outside of this scenario. Paid apps may have fewer
Dark Patterns and specific Dark Patterns might appear only
later in the use of an application. However, free apps are the
most popular among users [89], and ten minutes of usage were
enough to explore most of the UIs of the app.
While we followed a structured list of tasks among all apps
during the recording [70], differences among usage might exist.
Although we recognize this factor as a possible limitation of
our classification, this process better represents the normal
behavior that users might have on the apps. This behavior
strictly depends on the features that application offers and, for
this reason, it can only be partially generalized.
As for the second study, we analyzed DP-blindness through
an online experiment. By design, we had to ask questions on
the Sneak into Basket Dark Pattern while it co-occurred
with a Preselection UI since there was no other individ-
ual instance of the former. This may have introduced some
form of bias due to the mixed effects of the two dark patterns.
Nevertheless, in the survey we explicitly asked participants to
comment on the malicious UI detected (if any): from the anal-
ysis of the comments, participants who perceived the presence
of a problem-focused on Sneak into Basket, thus suggest-
ing that they may not have been biased by the co-occurrence
of the two patterns.
Watching a video and actively using an app are two different
experiences. For this reason, it might have been more difficult
for respondents to spot Dark Patterns than in real-life situa-
tions. Our choice was guided by the goal of studying the effect
of DP-blindness on a wide number of participants. However,
in the future, an in-lab user study might be conducted to com-
pare our results with the active use of apps. Similarly, some
users stated that it was hard for them to capture the context and
goals of the apps in thirty seconds. Deciding the right length of
the videos was one of the challenges of this experiment. Too
long videos would have invalidated DP-blindness results since
users would need to remember too many UIs and interactions.
Thirty seconds was the best compromise we could find.
Furthermore, given the difficulty in finding apps without multi-
ple instances of Dark Patterns in less than 30 seconds, we were
limited in the selection of the applications for our experiment.
In the future, different apps and more types of Dark Patterns
should be studied to experiment with the DP-blindness effect
under different conditions. This study could be carried out by
implementing ad-hoc applications employing Dark Patterns
in isolation. Although with this approach the experiment may
lose external validity, more types of malicious designs and
different UIs could be studied.
Finally, due to our recruitment process, many participants had
a high level of education (e.g., 23% have a doctoral degree),
thus limiting the representatives of our sample with respect to
the overall population of mobile app users.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we presented two studies we conducted to assess
the prevalence of dark patterns in mobile applications and
the user’s perception of the problem. We first analyzed 240
apps belonging to 8 different categories on the Google Play
Store and manually identified and classified dark patterns they
included, finding that 95% of the analyzed apps contain one
or more Dark Patterns. Afterward, we conducted an online
experiment involving 584 respondents who were asked to rate
the UI of a subset of apps considered in the first study. The
outcome highlighted that most of the times users could not
perceive the presence of malicious designs. These results lead
to several implications and challenges, e.g., how to increase
the user’s awareness of dark patterns: these represent the main
item of our future research agenda, which targets the definition
of methods to identify and characterize dark patterns.
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